It is perfectly natural that people should disagree about philosophical issues. We all know that it is virtually impossible that total agreement will become reality when it comes to, for instance, moral questions. And I, for one, believe that there is no “truth” about ethical questions anyway (a position known as non-cognitivism). This non-agreement and pluralism of values is something that must be accepted as a fundamental fact, especially in modern societies. These conflicts must, thus, be solved by some procedure which produces winners and losers in the struggle of values (this is the case in every social context, regardless of whether a state exists or not). I think the most fair procedure is a majority vote, since if there is no objective truth about which values are correct, what other reasonable way could there be to determine collective decisions?
Nevertheless, some people would not accept this. They believe that some values are objectively better than others, so it would be unfair if every value would be able to compete on equal terms in a majority decision. This attitude I have named meta-aggression (for article reference, see the Author-page on this blog). It is fairly well established, at least in libertarian circles, what “aggression” is: to invade someone’s personal sphere by physically harming them or taking their possessions. The standard form of libertarianism is all about rejecting aggression (unless it is performed as retaliation for previous aggression).
This non-aggression principle is, however, only one of several possible values. Some people believe that aggression (as defined by libertarians) is sometimes justified, for instance by taxing people for purposes they have not consented to. Now those who endorse the non-aggression principle would claim that the second group is engaging in unjustified aggression if they proceed with the taxation. The second group may, however, claim that the libertarians are unjustified in resisting their aggression. It is this kind of resistance – if it is defended on the (false) grounds that non-aggression principle is “true”, while the opponents’ principles are “false” – that I would like to call meta-aggression.
It can also be called a sort of philosophical hubris, i.e., using a controversial (and, to my mind, false) metaethical position to claim some kind of political privilege. Of course, this kind of hubris is often expressed in less sophisticated ways than through explicit metaethical argument. One of the most insidious ways is to argue as if there is some self-evident “default” position in ethics. The burden of proof is, then, on those who want to argue for something else than this default position. Another way in which this hubris can be expressed is simply through ridicule or scorn (rather than dispassionate argumentation) against alternative positions. A third way is the silent treatment, i.e., simply not discussing other ethical positions, because they are simply not worth mentioning.
Of course, this kind of hubris is not always something dangerous or especially deplorable. But when it is used in the political arena (and turned into meta-aggression), then it becomes dangerous and deplorable, because it is often directed against the political procedure that I find the most fair, namely majority rule.