Against Culturally Biased Ethics

I am a big proponent of “universalist” ethics, i.e., finding ethical principles which can be shared by all people in the world. Thus, it is important to try to find some common core deep in us all about what might be called good or bad. The hedonist will, of course, claim that the intuition that pleasure is good and pain is bad is the most plausible candidate for that common core. There might be some people who simply do not have this intuition – they might not see anything “bad” in experiencing pain or seeing someone else experiencing it, or anything “good” in experiencing pleasure – but I think it is still the most widespread intuition among human beings.

However, people have other intuitions too, and many philosophers today believe that we must take account of many intuitions, and attempt to achieve some balance between them. (The good thing about hedonism, on the other hand, is that there is just one fundamental intuition, so there is no other no need to find a “balance”.) One risk with this methodology is that it is no longer universalist, or at least not as universalist as it could be. This is because intuitions about what is good and bad are often strongly affected by our own culture (something which the hedonist principle presumably is not, or at least to a lesser degree than other candidates).

A recent reading of Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Ethics made me contemplate examples of culturally determined moral intuitions. Spencer, for instance, observes that many cultures have been extremely aggressive, and some have seen murder as perfectly honorable. Common have also been practices like slavery (including kidnapping women to “marry”), cannibalism, and different forms of stealing and robbery. It seems that thieves – at least successful and cunning ones – have been admired in many cultures. Two among the many examples of the latter are an African tribe called Waganda, in which “[T]he distinctions between meum and tuum are very ill-defined; and indeed all sin is only relative, the crime consisting in being detected”, and the Fijians, among which “[s]uccess, without discovery, is deemed quite enough to making thieving virtuous, and a participation in the ill-gotten gains honourable”. We see, then, that moral intuitions about property rights are very different across cultures.

Even more conspicuous are, perhaps, the differences in sexual mores and family relations. We know that polygamy (and sometimes even polyandry) has been very often approved of. Among some peoples adultery has been accepted, and it is reported that “among the Esquimaux it is considered a great mark of friendship for two men to exchange wives for a day or two” (and they were not the only people doing this).

One could go on indefinitely recounting examples of customs that are very different from the ones we take for granted in our own societies. The point I wanted to make is that people in other cultures throughout history probably felt as strongly as we do that their way of doing things is intuitively correct, and if they were to develop ethical systems built on the methodology that all intuitions should be respected they would simply end up by justifying the existing customs of their own culture. And something seems to be wrong with this approach to ethics. Surely, it cannot be the task of ethics to simply affirm the prejudices and inherited conceptions of our own culture.

In short, when developing an ethical system, one should not assume anything, except the assumptions that are necessary to establish any ethical system at all. And it should be clear that the assumptions of the latter kind are assumptions, and not “truths”. In other words, we cannot simply accept our culturally biased values, unless we can justify why they are acceptable on a more fundamental (“universal”) level. If you disagree with the tribes and peoples who think that killing, stealing, prostitution, or polygamy is honorable, don’t simply assume that they are wrong and that you are right. Demonstrate how they are wrong (and how you are right) with appeal to culturally unbiased arguments. (The same should, of course, hold for those who disagree with you.)


On Laziness

To find out what (if anything) is immoral about laziness, we must first try to define it. On Wikipedia laziness is defined as “disinclination to activity or exertion despite having the ability to act or exert oneself”. This definition may not be totally adequate, since people would probably not call someone lazy who works all day with things they really like (i.e., it would not be “exertion” for them). If we, on the other hand, were to say that they are nevertheless “exerting” themselves in some way, despite the fact that they are thoroughly enjoying they work, we would have to concede that very few people are actually lazy, since we would not be able to distinguish this kind of exertion from paradigm cases of laziness, such as lying on the couch watching tv all day. The only significant difference between a film critic (who loves her job) and an unemployed movie buff (let’s say that the latter person also writes about movies on his blog)  might be the fact that the film critic gets paid. In this case the laziness of the movie buff, thus, cannot be constituted by the difference in “exertion”. Still, if we were to insist in calling the movie buff lazy anyway, we would have to concede that all people who have enjoyable jobs are lazy too. But that seems wrong.

A way of getting out of this dilemma would be to specify the nature of “exertion” in some way. We might define laziness as “disinclination to unpleasant activity or exertion despite having the ability to act or exert oneself”. In this way we couldn’t really tell (without further information) whether the film critic or the movie buff were lazy or not. In order to know whether someone is lazy or not they must be put to the test by being asked to do things they do not enjoy. Unfortunately, this leads to other problems, since, presumably, virtually everyone has a disinclination to do things they do not enjoy (i.e. find positively disagreeable). This would mean that almost all people are lazy.

Still, many people do things everyday that they find disagreeable, like going up too early in the morning, commuting to work, doing the work itself (which is usually a mix of agreeable and disagreeable tasks), cleaning the bathroom, shopping for groceries etc. (of course, some people genuine enjoy things like cleaning or shopping, but you catch my drift). One paradigm case of laziness seems to apply to those who are not willing to do those everyday unenjoyable things that most other people do. We might, for instance, think of unemployed people in countries with generous welfare provisions – at least those few who are unemployed because of their laziness.

So the difference between laziness and non-laziness does not seem to consist in differences in “inclinations”, since most people are disinclined to do unpleasant things. The difference seems to lie in the actual doing of unpleasant things. Most people are “lazy” in the sense that they would refrain from doing unpleasant things if they could, but the genuinely lazy people are those are actually not doing unpleasant things, while the industrious (let’s say that that is the opposite of lazy) are actually doing them.

If this account is reasonable we would have to say that, for instance, a rich heir who is never doing anything unpleasant is a lazy person. Maybe some people would be inclined to call such a person lazy; but when laziness is used in a pejorative sense (which it usually is) the idle rich are usually exempt from that sort of criticism. Poor people, on the other hand, who are avoiding unpleasant activities as well, are often called lazy, even in spite of the fact that rich people are able to avoid unpleasant activities to a higher degree than poor people. So it all seems to boil down to on who’s expense you are leading your displeasure-avoiding lifestyle. If you are living pleasurably on other people’s taxes you are condemned as lazy. If you are living on your own money (which we assume have been earned in an “honest” way) you are not condemned as lazy (although we might not call you industrious either).

But I don’t think this is the whole truth about laziness. If common language does not seem to condemn the rich heir as lazy on account that he is not being idle on someone else’s expense, he might nevertheless be called lazy for other reasons. For example, he might justly (again, according to common language) be called lazy if he refuses to fulfill certain social duties that may be unpleasant for him. If he prefers to stay at home relaxing with a drink by his swimming pool instead of helping out with certain arduous arrangements for his uncle’s funeral, then his family would probably be warranted in calling him lazy (among other things).

And now we may have struck at the core what what laziness and industriousness is all about. It seems to be mostly about fulfilling certain (unpleasant) duties – duties which might be of various kinds, but often social or economic. The reason, then, that some of the unemployed might be called lazy seems to be that they fail to fulfill a presumed duty to share the burdens of economic life and to contribute to the economic stock of riches that they themselves are drawing from (again, we are assuming the context of the welfare state). The reason why the rich heir discussed above is called lazy is that he fails to fulfill his duty as a member of the extended family. Another example might be a priest who declines to preform important (but arduous) rituals because he would rather do something more pleasant.

So, let’s proceed from the latest definition of laziness, i.e., that it consists in the non-performance of unpleasant duties, to the question of whether laziness is really immoral or not. Evidently, it depends on whether one thinks that we have any moral duties or not. If you, for instance, believe that we only have negative duties, i.e., duties to refrain from doing certain things to others (for instance, harming them physically or taking their property), then it seems hard to call laziness immoral. No doubt, a person might violate negative duties out of laziness. A person might, for instance, turn to robbing because she finds that less unpleasant and time-consuming than working. But the person who subscribes to this libertarian philosophy would probably not call this a problem of laziness, because laziness seems to imply non-activity and non-performance. When a duty is unfulfilled through activity and performance people would probably avoid the label laziness (laziness, in other words, is about not doing things). I suspect that a firm believer in negative liberty would mostly use that label to describe the reasons that some are poor and others rich etc., because according this worldview people only get what they deserve. If you are lazy you will simply become poor, and if you do not fulfill your social duties you will simply become lonely. And if these are your choices, that is up to you.

Thus, laziness only seems to appear as a moral problem if we actually think that people have positive duties. Let’s take the example of the unemployed. If you, like me, are a hedonistic utilitarian you will think that people have a duty to contribute to maximizing pleasure, or, perhaps more practically relevant, to minimizing pain. One way of doing this could be to taking an ordinary job. Obvious examples of professions who contribute to reducing pain are doctors, nurses, or firemen; but most professions contribute to it in more indirect ways by making our everyday lives run smoothly.

It seems, then, that a conscious choice to live on unemployment benefits, in spite of the fact that one would be able to find a job, may be immoral. In other words, it may be a case of immoral laziness. I say that it “may” be so, because it is still possible for the unemployed to engage in other sorts of activities instead of paid work which could contribute to the well-being of other people. In other words, since unemployment (even voluntary unemployment) does not by itself constitute laziness, the moral status of the unemployed depends on how they actually spend their time. It is still possible for them to fulfill the duty which consists in doing what one can to maximize happiness in the world. (Needless to say, most cases of unemployment are not voluntary, unless we are taking “voluntary” in a highly formalistic and morally useless sense.)

When it comes to other kinds of social duties, whose neglect is commonly condemned as laziness, we would have to examine the purpose of those duties in order to resolve the moral question. In some social settings the neglect of social duties might be a valuable protest against unreasonable demands. In other words, as a hedonist one cannot accept a “duty” that does not, in fact, contribute to enhanced well-being. Nevertheless, refusing to fulfill a “false” duty does not get one off the hook when it comes to participating in fulfilling the real duty of maximizing happiness. You might be warranted in skipping some religious social requirement if you think that this requirement is only making the world worse; but then you should find something more productive to do instead than sitting by the pool all day.

The main thing for the hedonist is that you should find some time to make yourself useful for other people (in the sense that you should contribute to making their lives happier). If you are not fulfilling that duty then you may rightly be condemned as lazy. Of course, this does not mean that you should devote all your time to the service of others. After all, your happiness is also a part of the total sum of happiness. And we all need some recreation in order to fulfill the rest of our tasks in an efficient manner. Furthermore, there are many ways of contributing to happiness in society. The obvious ways are doing volunteer work to directly help the less fortunate, but one one can also spend time educating oneself in order to contribute to the betterment of society in more structural ways, or composing music or writing poetry for others to enjoy etc. etc.

Now let’s return to the case of lying on the couch watching TV all day. Would the hedonist say that this constitutes laziness and worthy of moral condemnation? In many cases, yes. No doubt, there are many valuable things one can learn by watching TV which might be of profit in one’s work as a pleasure-maximizer, but it would be hard to claim that a lifestyle dominated by the television is the most efficient type of lifestyle. And it would be hard to claim that watching television all day is such a blissful activity for you that the pleasure of it outstrips all other things you could have done for the benefit of other people. If we replace television with computer games it is even harder to see how more than a very modest amount of time per day could be reasonable.

Of course, I do not want to scare  anyone away from hedonism by claiming that you should devote a lot of effort to the improvement of society. If you already work full-time and have children to take care of it might be hard to squeeze in a lot of such activities on top of the necessary time for recreation for yourself, and that is understandable (besides, working hard to earn money to give to charity or the taxman is not a bad way to contribute). But the least one can do is to try to be noticeably less lazy than the average person in your circumstances. If your perception is that most people who work as much as you do, do five hours of charity work per year, then try to do seven or eight yourself. If the average person reads half a book on politics per year, try to read two or three yourself. There is always something you can do instead of being lazy.

Discounting Preferential Pains

One problem in hedonistic utilitarianism is how to treat mental pain – or distress, as I would prefer to call it. The fact that some actions might cause distress to people sometimes leads people to make dubious interpretations of what hedonistic policies might look like. For example, if it is the case that the mere thought that homosexual intercourse is taking place causes some mental distress for a substantial amount of people, then wouldn’t the hedonist have to say that homosexual intercourse must be forbidden? (This may not be the most interesting example to bring forward, since most people who argue against homosexuality do not do it on utilitarian grounds, but anyway…)

To answer this we must firstly put the distress of those who are being denied the opportunity to engage in sexual activities in the balance. Even so, it may still be the case that the distress of a lot of straight people counterweighs the distress that comes from a relatively small minority of people being sexually frustrated. Would the hedonist have to concede that in this case, the ban on homosexual intercourse is still a good policy?

I would say no, since it is still the case that many (probably most) of those who feel such grave distress at the mere thought of homosexual intercourse taking place feel this distress merely because they have previously formed (or have been taught) the preference that homosexuality is wrong. On the other hand, most people who see absolutely nothing immoral with homosexuality do not feel very much mental distress when imagining homosexual activities, or at least not so much distress that they feel warranted in complaining about it.

In other words, if grave cases of mental distress are caused by certain preferences (or ideas), and if the distress would go away if the preference were to go away, then it seems unreasonable to count this distress in the summation of pleasures and pains. I might have a preference not to be tortured, but the pain of the torture does not go away if I somehow managed to talk myself out of this preference. I might have a preference for eating ice cream, but the pleasure of eating ice cream would (in most cases) not go away if I got rid of this preference (otherwise, imagine how easy it would be to lose weight, stop smoking, etc.).

But the pain of thinking about about homosexuality will (at least in most cases) be considerably mitigated if the preference against it disappears. We might say the same thing about the pains and pleasures pertaining to revenge. If we get the (rather primitive) idea out of our heads that all wrongs must be revenged by inflictions of pain to the offender that supersedes the pain inflicted to the victim, then we would probably not feel so much pain when someone who has done us wrong is not getting the punishment he or she “deserves”.

It should also be added that we are often fooled by our preferential pleasures when it comes to planning our own lives. We often think that we will be happier if we only take this or that journey, buy new clothes or furniture, pursue a certain career, win another medal, have another child etc. etc. Often we turn out to be mistaken. Or preferences do not always increase our pleasure (or reduce our pain). Of course, it may be the case that we get a certain amount of joy (mental pleasure) from the mere act of planning these future events, and it would seem strange to discount this joy just because it is built out of as yet imaginary things. If it all stopped at planning then no harm would be done; but if we are fooled by these preferential joys we will eventually try to make the things themselves happen, and often find out that we are no happier than before. We would, in other words, find out ex post facto that we could have used our energy on other things that would, perhaps, have a greater change of increasing our pleasure.

Mozi and the Dangers of Narrow Utilitarianism

In the minds of some (perhaps most) people, “utilitarianism” has a special meaning. It often refers to an extremely “materialistic” view, which aims at maximization of wealth. This is not surprising, since utilitarianism has been (but less so nowadays) associated with economics. In the early 19th century, those who wrote on economics (or “political economy”, as it was usually called) were not seldom adherents to hedonistic utilitarianism of the Benthamite kind. Later in the same century, however, the goal of maximizing pleasure was by many economists regarded as too imprecise to be used in scientific discussions. So pleasure was generally replaced by “utility”, and the by the maximization of utility, it was usually meant the highest possible satisfaction of subjective preferences. Moreover, the easiest way to “measure” such satisfaction of preferences is by measuring income, wealth, and the like. It is hard to be scientific if one wants to measure levels of mental “satisfaction”.

It is, of course, a shame that many associate utilitarianism with this “economistic” way of thinking, since it is rather barren if it is regarded as a moral view (and if it is not intended as a moral view, then why should one make policy recommendations on the basis of it?). Nevertheless, it is, in fact, a very old view, and if we look back in the history of ideas, we find one extreme adherent to it in the Chinese philosopher Mozi (or Mo Tzu), who lived around 400 B.C. Mozi put forward a principle of “universal love” (not really emotional love, but rather “concern”) which is not all that different from the utilitarian/hedonist idea of impartiality when it comes to maximization of happiness, and he criticized the Confucian view that parents and relatives should always be one’s first concern.

However, It seems that Mozi’s prime concern was economic production, and he criticized Chinese rulers who squandered resources by, for instance, waging war. He also criticized traditions that seemed very unproductive, like expensive funerals and long periods of mourning, during which one was expected to do no work.

Now, it is, of course, rather uncontroversial to criticize war and the destructive forces and costs that it brings along. Somewhat less uncontroversial is perhaps the critique of superstitious practices that drain resources, but even people who subscribe to such beliefs would probably agree that such things cannot swallow too much of one’s material resources.

But there are other things in Mozi’s doctrine which appear more controversial. To quote a scholar: “To attain the end of a rich, numerous, orderly, peaceful, and literally ‘blessed’ population, Mo Tzu was willing to sacrifice very nearly everything else. Clothing should keep out the cold in winter and the heat in summer but should not be attractive. Food should be nourishing but not well-seasoned. Houses should keep out the cold and heat, the rain and thieves, but should have no useless decoration.” Mozi went so far as to condemn music, “which used men’s time and wealth in the making and playing of instruments, yet created nothing tangible”.

Mozi’s utilitarianism is, thus, extreme in its maximization of “utility”, in the form of production of material, “useful” things, and the production of new people, and in its rejection of what is of interest to the hedonistic utilitarian, namely, pleasure. Now, it is probably the case that no utilitarian economist adhere to such an anti-hedonistic view. Nevertheless, their political recommendations have not always been all that different. Politics is often regarded as a wealth-making machine, whereas pleasure is something that should be left to individuals, and not concern politicians. Just enable people to make money, and the rest will take care of itself.

The problem with this is that the way we make money affects the possibilities of leading a more pleasurable life. And it is not easy for an individual to plan these things by her- or himself, when the system itself is geared towards a specific way of making money. It is, for instance, hard to find a career that will give you a reasonable balance between leisure and money. The logic of the system demands that you either work hard for a lot of money, or work very little for little money (although many also work hard for little money, of course, just as a few lucky people work little for a lot of money). It is hard to find a career which requires a medium amount of work for a medium amount of money, even though that would probably produce more pleasure than the present way of making a living.

In conclusion, utilitarian politics must from the beginning regard people as interested in pleasure and promote it through politics, rather than decide that one thing (for instance, income) should serve as a proxy for happiness.

What is “Leftism” and How Can it Be Defended?

Recently I have been doing some writing on the concept “leftism” (which will probably be available soon as a small book). It is, of course, hard to define exactly what leftism is, but most people probably have a rough idea about what it means. My own method has been to approach the term as an ideal type, i.e., a sort of loose definition which enumerates characteristics normally associated with the phenomenon in question. When talking about ideal types, it is important to note that not all characteristics need to be found in all individual cases. But it is hard to say “objectively” how many characteristics one must observe, or how strongly they must be manifested. Again, an ideal type is not a precise definition.

For the purposes of my own investigations – and my defense of leftist politics – I assumed that the most important characteristic of leftism is a defense of relatively high levels of economic redistribution. It would be hard to call someone a leftist if he or she did not want higher levels of economic redistribution (mostly from rich to poor, of course) than, for instance, conservatives or libertarians, no matter how many of the other criteria for leftism they fulfill. On the other hand, it would, perhaps, be hard to call someone a “pure” leftist if she accepts high redistribution, but rejects all other characteristics of leftism.

The other characteristics or criteria that I include in my ideal type of leftism are support for: (radical) feminism, anti-discrimination laws and affirmative action, immigration and (some sort of) multiculturalism, bottom-up globalization and special rights for workers, and participatory and majoritarian democracy. One could probably also add environmentalist concerns (and a particular view of the state’s role to meet those concerns) to this list, but for different reasons I will not include it in my book.

I defend leftist politics by appealing to my hedonist ethics. I believe that, for instance, economic redistribution from the rich to the poor, a kind of feminism that makes us see beyond culturally specific gender roles, or a state that does not privilege any particular ethnicity or lifestyle can be defended on the grounds that it maximizes pleasure and (perhaps more important) minimizes pain.

I do not, in other words, appeal to Marxism in any way to defend leftism; and I believe that extensive ownership of the means of production by the state (or similar collective entities) would be mistaken. I believe leftists has relied too much on Marxism and other related theories to defend their positions. Hedonism is a more straightforward idea and it does not suffer from the many weaknesses that can be found in most other theories used to defend leftism. Of course, some may claim that the hedonist defense of leftism is not left enough. In that case, I would only answer that that would be a problem for such “left-leftism”, not for hedonism – unless, of course, the critics in question are prepared to make a philosophically rigorous argument against hedonism itself (and make better arguments for another moral theory).

Ethical Hiring and Firing

It struck me one day when I was passing a parking inspector on the street that that kind of job could not be very hard to learn, i.e., most ‘normal’ people could probably do it quite easily. Yet, it is probably the case the people who actually do jobs like that – jobs that most people can do with a small amount of on-the-job training – often have more work experience or education that is needed (but it could also be the case that they simply have the right social connections). There are other jobs that require some sort of education, but usually not a three- or four-year university degree. Many civil service jobs, for instance, ask for degrees in political science, law, sociology, etc. even though the job description has very little to do with the contents of such degrees.

In other words, many people are over-skilled or over-educated, relative to their present job. On the other hand, there are many people who remain unemployed because they can’t get the experience or education that will put them on the top of the list of the hiring employer. There might be a measure of ‘hidden’ discrimination in this.  We usually frown upon nepotism or favoritism, because we want to ensure equality of opportunity and meritocracy. Thus, one might want to rely on objective criteria (years of education, years of work experience, etc.) when hiring. But if these objective criteria are not very relevant for the job in question, then this appears to be nothing but a form of discrimination of those who have not been able to connect to the right kind of social networks (and we all know that social networks are of increasing importance when it comes to landing a job these days) or have been forced to stay away from work life for other reasons. And it is probably the case that this kind of discrimination hits people even harder than the ‘classic’ kinds of discrimination: race, ethnicity, sexual preference, age, religion etc.

Now, if we want to maximize happiness in society it seems that employers should relax their demands for education or experience, when those criteria are not very relevant for the job in question. Empirical research has confirmed that whereas people are able to adapt to many unfortunate circumstances in life (for instance, becoming disabled), unemployment  seems to be an exception to this. After the shock of becoming unemployed has receded, quality of life increases somewhat again, but usually not up to the pre-unemployment level. Combatting long term unemployment should, thus, be important for a hedonistic utilitarian. One way of doing this could be – at least for some vacancies – to consciously hire people who may have less experience or education than the top applicants. In other words, hiring people with adequate qualifications rather than people with excellent qualifications (which are unnecessary for doing the job in question anyway).

In times of high unemployment employers might receive hundreds of applications when they announce a vacancy, and it is hard to imagine that the person who actually gets the job is actually better at doing the job than any other person who ‘ranks’ from, let’s say, place 2 to 20 on the list. On the contrary, we all know from experience that a not insignificant amount of people we encounter in everyday life are more or less incompetent at their job. Thus, in many cases the policy suggested here would not only be more just, but also more efficient for society. But even if it turns out to reduce efficiency, we must always remember that it is always possible to sacrifice some efficiency if it means greater justice (i.e. overall happiness).

You can read more on this topic in my article ‘Ethics in Hiring: Nepotism, Meritocracy, or Utilitarian Compassion,’ in the lastest issue of Philosophy for Business.

Hedonism and Basic Income

As a hedonist, I have often defended the Welfare State, which includes, for instance, financial assistance to people who are unable to find work (or unable to work at all). The logic behind this is that the relief of suffering that ensues is not counteracted by a similar loss in pleasure by those who are taxed in order to fund such programs.

This kind of assistance can come in different forms. In Sweden, for example, there are unemployment benefits that are determined as a percentage of one’s previous salary (this has all sorts of requirements attached to it), but there is also means tested assistance which is calculated to cover only the necessities of life (rent, food, clothes, etc.). Other kinds of assistance exist for the sick, for students, for parents, and so on.

The idea behind a basic income is that these different kinds of assistance can be replaced by a single type of benefit that all citizens are entitled to. It does not matter whether they are unemployed, sick, students, parents, or simply people who choose not to work – they are all eligible to receive the basic income. The question is whether a basic income is preferable to traditional benefits from a hedonist perspective.

There is no clearcut answer to that question. As I stated at the outset, hedonists should defend some kind of assistance to those that are unable (and perhaps also unwilling) to work. On the plus side, a basic income lets people choose an “epicurean” way of life, which – I believe – can be conducive to increased happiness. Epicurus’s idea was that one does not need much in the sense of material wealth to be happy. More important is leisure and good friends. A basic income also enables engagement in political life (“civic virtue”), which is somewhat in line with John Stuart Mill’s ideals.

A drawback to basic income, however,  is that it may render some people too passive. Empirical research seems to confirm that sitting alone at home all day watching television (or something similar) is detrimental to one’s happiness. This means that a basic income is most beneficial to those who have good ideas about how to use their free time in an active way. Some traditional unemployment benefits require certain activities on the part of the recipient, and this is probably what some people need (whereas the idea behind the basic income is that it is supposed to be totally unconditional).

Is there a risk that a basic income scheme would become to expensive? Of course, hedonists must always take account of the fact that many people are not hedonists, and they will perhaps resent paying taxes to finance a basic income (which means that, for instance, entrepreneurs may “obstruct” these policies). On the other hand, it is not to be suspected that many people would choose to live on the basic income instead of working, because we must suppose that the level of the basic income is set rather low. It will allow people to live modestly by themselves, but it should not be set so high as to allow, for example, the forming of a family (something that most people want).

There is, however, a kind of paradox involved in this. If – as I believe – people could become happier by living in a more epicurean way and renounce many modern pleasures, and if more people realized this, then perhaps more people would want to live on a basic income instead of working. But then we could not afford the basic income scheme. The ideal, then, supposes that most people would not choose the epicurean way to happiness! If too many people choose that way we would have to come up with some other scheme, for instance, shortening the workday for everyone to five hours, which would radically reduce unemployment and increase leisure time (for most people). This compromise would be beneficial both to those who have a hard time finding something meaningful to do in their spare time and those who can’t get enough spare time. At the same time the level of production that is necessary to maintain a decent material quality of life can be kept going.

I have uploaded a longer text on the hedonist case for a basic income on the Social Science Research Network.